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O P I N I O N 
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge:    
Plaintiffs Domingo Colón Montañez and Timothy 
Hale appeal the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants on claims for damages 
and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Defendants are officials of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections (DOC) and its related prisons.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm in part and reverse in part the 
District Court’s judgment. 
 
I. 
 
This appeal involves the consolidated challenges of 
two inmates in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
prison system to the DOC’s implementation of a program that 
automatically deducts funds from prisoners’ inmate accounts 
to cover court-ordered restitution, fines, and costs.  The DOC 
maintains bank accounts for the inmates incarcerated in its 
facilities.  Inmates use the funds in these accounts to cover 
the costs of certain goods and services they purchase during 
their time of incarceration.  The DOC provides for the most 
basic needs of the inmates—such as food and shelter—
without charge to the inmates’ accounts.  Inmates must pay 
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for access to additional products and services, unless they 
qualify as indigent.  For example, inmates must purchase 
items such as soap, deodorant, toothpaste, and over-the-
counter medications.  Inmates are also responsible for 
medical co-pays and the cost of access to legal services, 
although in some circumstances inmates’ constitutional rights 
compel the DOC to provide access to these services without 
regard to inmates’ ability to pay.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. 
Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 1997).  Inmates accrue 
money in their accounts through wages—capped at 51 cents 
an hour—for work conducted for the prison system or 
through gifts from friends and family. 
 
In 1998, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted Act 84, 
which amended section 9728(b) of the Pennsylvania 
Sentencing Code.  Through these amendments, the legislature 
authorized the DOC “to make monetary deductions from 
inmate personal accounts for the purpose of collecting 
restitution or any other court-ordered obligation or costs.”  42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9728(b)(5).  Act 84 also directed that the 
“Department of Corrections shall develop guidelines relating 
to its responsibilities under this paragraph.”  Id. 
 
The DOC exercised its obligation to develop 
guidelines relating to the collection of court-ordered monetary 
obligations of its inmates by promulgating policy DC-ADM-
005, effective October 16, 1998 (the DOC Policy).1  The 
current version of the Policy provides, in relevant part, that 
                                              
1 The DOC policy has been amended several times since its 
initial promulgation, most recently in October 2007.  Neither 
party suggests that the amendments impact Plaintiffs’ claims 
for damages or injunctive relief.   
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the business office of each DOC facility makes “payments of 
20% of the inmate’s account balance and monthly income for 
restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines, and/or penalties 
associated with the criminal proceedings pursuant to” Act 84, 
“provided that the inmate has a balance that exceeds $10.00.”  
The DOC’s authority to make deductions is automatically 
triggered when it receives a sentencing order that includes a 
monetary portion.  There is no requirement in the Policy that 
the relevant court order contain a provision for the automatic 
deduction of funds from an inmate account.  The DOC does 
not provide inmates with any hearing or other opportunity to 
be heard before the deductions commence. 
 
Montañez and Hale are two inmates in the DOC prison 
system who have had funds deducted from their inmate 
accounts pursuant to the DOC Policy.  Each separately filed 
suit against DOC Secretary Jeffrey Beard, as well as other 
DOC officials responsible for processing the deductions 
(collectively, the Corrections Officials).  The crux of both 
lawsuits is that the plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights 
were violated when the Corrections Officials enforced the 
DOC Policy and made automatic deductions from the 
plaintiffs’ inmate accounts.2  Because these claims depend on 
the notice and process granted to each plaintiff, we will 
discuss the specific process given to each plaintiff in some 
detail. 
 
A. 
                                              
2 In addition, Montañez asserted an additional claim that the 
DOC Policy violated his rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.   
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On January 6, 2004, Hale was sentenced in a 
Pennsylvania criminal proceeding to 82 to 160 months in 
prison.  As part of this sentence, Hale was ordered to pay 
restitution in the amount of $1,191.11, and a fine of $1,000.  
The sentencing judge also ordered Hale to pay an unspecified 
amount for “the cost of the proceeding.”  The final total of the 
costs, $1,462.53, was not determined until sometime after the 
sentencing hearing.  The sentencing judge made no reference 
to Act 84 or the DOC’s authority to make automatic 
deductions from funds held in an inmate account. 
 
The parties dispute the exact parameters of the notice 
Hale received regarding the DOC Policy and Act 84 upon his 
intake to the DOC prison system.  According to a sworn 
declaration submitted by the Corrections Officials, Hale 
underwent new prisoner orientation when he was first 
admitted, at which time he was informed that money could be 
deducted from his inmate account to satisfy court-ordered 
debts.  The Corrections Officials also contend that Hale was 
shown a video orientation and given an inmate handbook that 
set forth pertinent provisions of the DOC’s grievance and 
debt collection policies.  Further, Hale’s institutional file 
contains a form notice dated February 19, 2004—prior to the 
initiation of any deductions—which sets forth the substance 
of the DOC Policy.  The record does not confirm, however, 
whether Hale actually received this form notice.  Hale 
contradicts each of these assertions in a sworn declaration of 
his own.  In particular, Hale asserts that he was never 
informed that the DOC would deduct funds from his inmate 
account and was unaware of the DOC Policy until after the 
deductions commenced.   
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Hale admits that, during his initial orientation, he 
received an inmate handbook, which contains an explanation 
of the inmate accounts.  While the handbook does not contain 
a copy of the DOC Policy, it does contain two references to 
the DOC’s ability to deduct funds from inmate accounts.  In 
particular, the handbook explains, “If you were ordered to pay 
restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines, and/or penalties 
associated with court proceedings, the DOC will collect 
monies from your account to pay those amounts.”  The 
handbook further provides: 
 
1.  In accordance with 42 Pa. C.S. 
§9728, the DOC shall collect monies 
from your account if the court orders you 
to pay restitution, reparation, fees, costs, 
fines, and/or penalties associated with 
the criminal proceedings. 
2.  The DOC shall also collect court 
costs and filing fees as ordered by a 
court. 
. . . 
7.  For more information on the 
collection of debts, refer to DOC policy 
DC-ADM 005. 
Hale also notes that there are several discrepancies 
with respect to his total amount of court-ordered restitution, 
fees, and costs.  The judgment entered in Hale’s criminal case 
indicates that he owed a total of $2,783.86, while his 300B 
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form3 lists a total of $4,373.64.  In addition, Hale’s 300B 
form erroneously inflated the amount Hale owed in restitution 
by over $700.   
 
It is undisputed that the DOC provided no opportunity 
for Hale to be heard regarding his record of court-ordered 
monetary obligations or the automatic deductions.  Hale filed 
this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania on December 15, 2004. 
 
B. 
 On January 7, 2000, Montañez participated in a 
Pennsylvania criminal sentencing hearing at which he 
received a sentence of 5.5 to 20 years in prison.  Montañez 
was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $148.60, 
a fine in the amount of $100, and the costs of the prosecution.  
As with Hale, the costs portion of Montañez’s sentence was 
not calculated until after the hearing.  At no point did the 
sentencing judge explain that the DOC had the authority to 
automatically deduct 20% of Montañez’s inmate account to 
pay these debts or otherwise refer to the DOC Policy. 
 
                                              
3 The 300B is a form created by the DOC to assist it in 
determining the total amount of court-ordered obligations 
imposed on each inmate in the DOC system.  The DOC 
provides these forms to the Court of Common Pleas for the 
county in which the inmate was sentenced.  The Clerk of 
Court for each county supplies the information and fills out 
the form, which is then transmitted to the DOC. 
9 
 
Montañez asserts that he did not receive his 300B form 
or any other notice as to the total amount of his court-ordered 
obligations in time for him to move for reconsideration or file 
a direct appeal from the District Court’s assessment of costs.  
Montañez did, however, file an appeal with respect to his 
conviction and sentence, and later filed petitions and other 
requests to modify his amounts owed. 
As with Hale, the parties disagree as to the full extent 
of notice Montañez received regarding the DOC Policy upon 
his intake to the DOC prison system.  Montañez asserts that 
he was never informed about the total amount of his court-
ordered obligations, never received a copy of his 300B form, 
and was never informed about the DOC Policy.  The 
Corrections Officials, on the other hand, dispute each of these 
claims.  Both parties agree that the inmate handbook given to 
Montañez upon his admission to the DOC system contained 
no reference to the DOC policy.  It is similarly undisputed 
that Montañez had no opportunity to be heard before the 
deductions commenced. 
 
The DOC began deducting funds from Montañez’s 
account pursuant to its policy on April 6, 2000.  These 
deductions continued until 2010, when Montañez’s debt was 
satisfied.  Montañez admits that he received an inmate 
account statement every month, which included a debit 
described as “Act 84 transaction.”   
 
Montañez asserts that he was not aware of the import 
of this description, or of Act 84 or the DOC policy, until 
“sometime in 2002.”  Upon learning of the significance of 
these transactions, Montañez filed the first of a series of 
grievances with the DOC on November 17, 2002.  These 
grievances were predicated on the fact that Montañez had not 
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received any hearing to determine if he was able to afford the 
deductions, and questioned the lack of a court order 
authorizing the deductions.  The DOC rejected Montañez’s 
grievance, stating that it would “continue to collect fines, 
restitution and costs from” Montañez “unless the sentencing 
court enters an order relieving” him from his obligations.  On 
May 19, 2003, Montañez petitioned his sentencing judge 
seeking a copy of the order authorizing deductions from his 
account.  The court denied this request, indicating that it had 
never entered an order initiating automatic deductions from 
Montañez’s inmate account.  Montañez filed this lawsuit in 
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania on November 29, 2004.   
 
C. 
This is the third time these cases have been before our 
Court.  In two previous appeals, we held that the allegations 
in the complaints submitted by Hale and Montañez were 
sufficient to state a claim that their due process rights were 
violated.  See Montañez v. Beard, 344 F. App’x 833 (3d Cir. 
2009) (Montañez I); Hale v. Beard, 168 F. App’x 532 (3d Cir. 
2006).   
 
After post-remand discovery, the District Court 
granted the Corrections Officials’ motion for summary 
judgment on all claims.  In particular, the District Court ruled 
that: (1) Montañez’s claims were barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations; (2) Hale received all process he was due 
under the Constitution; and (3) the Corrections Officials were 
entitled to qualified immunity from all claims for monetary 
damages in any event.  Plaintiffs appeal from that decision. 
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II. 
This Court reviews “an award of summary judgment 
de novo, applying the same test on review that the District 
Court should have applied” and views the facts in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of 
Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  A court “shall grant summary judgment if 
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  Similarly, qualified 
immunity “raises a purely legal issue” that this Court reviews 
de novo.  Burns, 642 F.3d at 170. 
 
For the reasons stated below, we will reverse the 
District Court’s order with respect to Hale’s due process 
claim for injunctive relief.  We will affirm on all other 
grounds. 
 
A. 
Montañez argues that the District Court erred in 
concluding that his procedural due process claim was barred 
by the statute of limitations.  The statute of limitations for a § 
1983 claim arising in Pennsylvania is two years.  Kach v. 
Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009).  The District Court 
held that Montañez’s cause of action accrued, at the latest, 
when he filed a grievance asserting that the deductions from 
his account were “unconstitutional and a violation of due 
process” on November 17, 2002.  Because Montanez did not 
file his complaint in this action until November 29, 2004, the 
District Court concluded that Montañez’s claims were 
untimely.  We will affirm. 
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1. 
 
The date of accrual in a § 1983 action is determined by 
federal law.  Kach, 589 F.3d at 634.  Under federal law, a 
cause of action accrues “‘when the plaintiff knew or should 
have known of the injury upon which the action is based.’”  
Id. (quoting Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 
582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998)).  Montañez argues that his cause of 
action accrued on November 27, 2002, because this was the 
date the DOC denied his grievance challenging the 
deductions.   
 
Montañez’s cause of action is based on the injury he 
allegedly suffered when the DOC applied the DOC Policy to 
his inmate account without due process.  This Court has 
previously noted with regard to deductions from inmate 
accounts that an “alleged violation of [an inmate’s] 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process occur[s] at the 
moment he was deprived of his property interest without 
notice and a predeprivation hearing (i.e., when [prison] 
employees seized the money in his inmate account).”  
Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 694 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Following this rule, Montañez’s alleged injury occurred on 
April 6, 2000, when the DOC first deducted funds from his 
account.4  It was at this point that the DOC deprived 
                                              
4 Montañez also argues that his cause of action did not accrue 
until he should have known that his due process rights had 
been violated.  This is not correct; a cause of action accrues 
upon “a plaintiff’s discovery of the actual, as opposed to the 
legal, injury . . ..”  Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & 
Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386 (3d Cir. 1994).  Montañez’s 
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Montañez of his property interests, allegedly without due 
process.  Montañez “knew or should have known of” this 
injury within a month of the first deduction, as he received an 
inmate account statement that reflected the debit from his 
account.  See Kach, 589 F.3d at 634.  As a result, Montañez’s 
claim accrued in April or May of 2000, and the statute of 
limitations had expired by the time he filed his complaint in 
this action. 
2. 
 
Montañez seeks to avoid application of the statute of 
limitations by invoking the continuing violation doctrine.  
Under that doctrine, “when a defendant’s conduct is part of a 
continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act 
evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations 
period.”  Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
There are several barriers that preclude Montañez from 
invoking this doctrine.  Initially, the continuing violation 
doctrine does not apply when the plaintiff “is aware of the 
injury at the time it occurred.”  Morganroth & Morganroth v. 
Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, P.C., 331 F.3d 406, 417 n.6 
(3d Cir. 2003).  As we have just explained, Montañez was 
aware of the relevant injury—the government seizure of 
funds from his inmate account—very shortly after it occurred.  
Despite this knowledge, Montañez failed to assert his rights 
in a timely fashion.   
 
                                                                                                     
actual injury occurred on the date that funds were deducted 
from his inmate account. 
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Furthermore, Montañez’s argument that he suffered a 
continuing violation is based on the fact that the DOC 
continued to make deductions from his account.  But a 
“continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful 
acts, not continual ill effects from an original violation.”  
Weis-Buy Servs., Inc. v. Paglia, 411 F.3d 415, 423 (3d Cir. 
2005) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The DOC’s decision to enforce the DOC Policy against 
Montañez and its first deduction from his prison account 
constituted a discrete and independently actionable act, which 
triggered Montañez’s obligation to assert his rights.  The fact 
that the DOC made subsequent deductions pursuant to the 
DOC Policy does not make out a continuing violation.  See 
Cowell, 263 F.3d at 292–93. 
3. 
 
In addition to his arguments regarding accrual, 
Montañez also argues that the statute of limitations should be 
equitably tolled, either because the DOC “fraudulently 
concealed its responsibility for the deductions” or because 
Montañez engaged in the inmate grievance process to settle 
his claims.  We disagree, and find no basis to equitably toll 
the statute of limitations. 
 
Generally, “state tolling principles also govern § 1983 
claims” unless they conflict with “federal law or policy.”  
Kach, 589 F.3d at 639.  “Pennsylvania’s fraudulent 
concealment doctrine tolls the statute of limitations where 
‘through fraud or concealment the defendant causes the 
plaintiff to relax vigilance or deviate from the right of 
inquiry.’”  Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449 F.3d 502, 516 (3d Cir. 
2006) (quoting Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 757 
F.2d 548, 556 (3d Cir. 1985)).  Even if a plaintiff can 
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establish that the defendant engaged in fraudulent 
concealment, the statute of limitations “begins to run when 
the injured party knows or reasonably should know of his 
injury and its cause.”  Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 861 
(Pa. 2005).   
 
Montañez argues that the DOC “fraudulently 
concealed its responsibility for the deductions” by suggesting 
that he take his complaints about the deductions to his 
sentencing court.  The statements Montañez identifies, 
however, were made in response to the grievances he filed 
more than two years after his cause of action accrued.  As a 
result, any alleged fraud by the DOC could not possibly have 
been the reason that Montañez delayed asserting his rights.  
See Uber v. Slippery Rock Univ. of Pa., 887 A.2d 362, 366 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).  When he finally did file a 
grievance, it requested “inmate account staff and business 
office staffs [sic] to stop deducting 20% out of” the funds in 
his account, which shows that Montañez was not confused 
about the source of his injury.  In other words, Montañez 
waited over two years after learning of the deductions to take 
any action to protect his rights.  Montañez simply delayed too 
long to take advantage of equitable tolling doctrines. 
 
In sum, the statute of limitations on Montañez’s claims 
expired before he initiated this lawsuit, and no basis for 
equitable tolling applies.  We will therefore affirm the District 
Court’s holding that Montañez’s claims are time-barred.5  
                                              
5 Because we hold that Montañez’s claims are barred by the 
statute of limitations, we need not consider his argument that 
the District Court erred by failing to consider his claims under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Because there is no question that Hale’s due process claim 
was timely filed, however, we will now consider the merits of 
his appeal. 
 
B. 
 
  To analyze a claim for procedural due process, a 
court “must first ‘determine whether the nature of the interest 
is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property’ 
language of the Fourteenth Amendment.’”  Evans v. 
Secretary Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 650, 663 (3d Cir. 
2011) (quoting Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 
2010)).  If the court determines that “the interest asserted is 
protected by the Due Process Clause, the question then 
becomes what process is due to protect it.”  Newman, 617 
F.3d at 783 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
Both parties agree that inmates have a constitutional 
property interest in funds held in prison accounts.  See 
Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 179.  Thus, the only remaining question 
on the merits of Hale’s due process claim is whether the 
Corrections Officials provided sufficient process when they 
implemented the DOC Policy and deducted funds from 
Hale’s inmate account.   
 
1. 
 
Before turning to the merits of Hale’s due process 
challenge, we wish to emphasize the narrowness of Hale’s 
constitutional claim.  Hale does not seek in this action to 
challenge the final amount of fines, restitution, and costs 
imposed against him by the sentencing judge in his state 
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criminal proceeding.  Nor does he otherwise seek to 
undermine the validity of his criminal sentence.  Such a 
challenge would not be cognizable in a § 1983 action unless 
the prisoner could prove that he had previously obtained a 
favorable termination of his state court criminal proceeding.  
See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Gilles v. 
Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2005).  Further, Hale 
does not suggest that any additional process must be given by 
the Pennsylvania courts rather than DOC administrators.  Cf. 
Buck v. Beard, 879 A.2d 157 (Pa. 2005) (rejecting the 
argument that the due process considerations require a 
judicial default hearing before deductions may be made from 
inmate accounts).   
Instead, Hale’s due process claim is narrowly focused 
on whether inmates must be provided with notice of the DOC 
Policy and an opportunity to be heard regarding application of 
the Policy prior to the first deduction,6 and, if they must, 
whether the current procedures implemented by the 
Corrections Officials are sufficient.  It is to these narrow 
issues that we now turn. 
 
2. 
 
The District Court ruled that the DOC’s post-
deprivation grievance procedures are sufficient to meet Hale’s 
procedural due process rights, and that no pre-deprivation 
hearing was required.  We disagree and will reverse. 
                                              
6 As Hale’s counsel acknowledged during oral argument, Hale 
seeks only notice and a single opportunity to be heard prior to 
the first deduction.  He does not argue that inmates must 
receive notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to each 
and every subsequent deduction. 
18 
 
 
Procedural due process claims are governed by the 
standard first enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 335 (1976).  Under that standard, a court is to weigh 
three factors:  (1) “the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action”, (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation 
of such interest through the procedures used” and the value of 
“additional or substitute procedural safeguards”, and (3) the 
governmental interest, “including the function involved and 
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirements would entail.”  Id.   
 
State prisoners plainly have a property interest in the 
funds in their inmate accounts.  See, e.g., Reynolds, 128 F.3d 
at 179.  As other courts have held, however, this interest is 
reduced because inmates “are not entitled to complete control 
over their money while in prison.”  See Mahers v. Halford, 76 
F.3d 951, 954 (8th Cir. 1996).  Further, the government has 
an “important state interest” in collecting restitution, costs, 
and fines from incarcerated criminal offenders to compensate 
victims.  See id. at 956.   
 
The question remains, however, whether additional 
pre-deprivation process would be effective and whether that 
process would be overly burdensome on the government.  As 
a default matter, “[i]n situations where the State feasibly can 
provide a predeprivation hearing before taking property, it 
generally must do so regardless of the adequacy of a 
postdeprivation tort remedy to compensate for the taking.”  
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990).  Thus, where 
the pre-deprivation safeguards “would be of use in preventing 
the kind of deprivation alleged,” the state must provide such a 
hearing.  Id. at 139.  We have previously applied this default 
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rule to state actions pursuant to “an established state 
procedure” that would deprive inmates of the funds in their 
inmate accounts.  Higgins, 293 F.3d at 694; see also Burns v. 
Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 171–73 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 
Where pre-deprivation process is not feasible, this 
default rule does not apply.  Thus, in the “unusual case” 
where “the value of predeprivation safeguards . . . is 
negligible in preventing the kind of deprivation at issue,” the 
state is not constitutionally required to provide any pre-
deprivation process.  Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 129.  Following 
this rule, we have held that assessments against inmate 
accounts to defray the costs of medical treatment, Reynolds, 
128 F.3d 166, or the application of a fixed fee to defray the 
costs of room and board, Tillman v. Lebanon County Corr. 
Facility, 221 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2000), present the types of 
situations where pre-deprivation hearings are impractical or 
would be meaningless.  Most pertinently, the court in Tillman 
reasoned that a program involving “routine matters of 
accounting, with a low risk of error,” requires no pre-
deprivation process.  Id. at 422.    
 
Taken together, these cases make clear that when pre-
deprivation process could be effective in preventing errors, 
that process is required.  See Burns, 642 F.3d 163; Higgins, 
293 F.3d at 693–94. When deductions from inmate accounts 
involve “routine matters of accounting” based on fixed fees or 
where temporal exigencies require immediate action, pre-
deprivation hearings are not required.  Tillman, 221 F.3d at 
422; Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 180.  In either event, however, 
inmates are entitled to some pre-deprivation notice of the 
prison’s deduction policy.  See Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 180.   
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Applying this distinction, we find that the District 
Court erred in determining that pre-deprivation process was 
not constitutionally required.  Unlike the cases in which we 
have held that pre-deprivation process is unnecessary, there is 
nothing about the DOC Policy that requires the DOC to take 
immediate action to deduct funds from inmate accounts to 
satisfy court-ordered obligations.  Any short delay that might 
result from offering inmates an opportunity to be heard on 
application of the DOC Policy before it is applied would not 
seriously undermine the Commonwealth’s ability to recover 
costs.   
The DOC Policy does not involve fixed assessments 
that uniformly apply to all inmates.  Each inmate in the DOC 
system has a unique judgment, with individualized amounts 
of court-ordered obligations.  This case is thus unlike the 
room-and-board assessments in Tillman, which were a fixed 
$10 daily charge for each inmate.  Tillman, 221 F.3d at 414.  
For this reason, the DOC’s process of seeking deductions is 
not a mere “accounting” issue that applies a fixed dollar 
amount per day to each inmate.  Id. at 422.  It requires 
individualized process to determine each inmate’s total cost 
prior to the commencement of the deductions.   
 
Further, additional pre-deprivation process would 
mitigate at least some risk of error in the application of the 
DOC Policy.  Viewing the evidence in his favor, Hale did not 
obtain individualized information as to how much he actually 
owed for costs, fines, and restitution prior to deductions being 
made.  Hale had no opportunity to object to the total amounts 
entered into the DOC system.  In fact, Hale’s 300B form 
erroneously inflated the amount of his court-ordered 
restitution by nearly $800.  This error might have been 
prevented if Hale had been provided with a pre-deprivation 
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opportunity to review his personalized information and lodge 
objections to the deductions.  In other cases, a pre-deprivation 
opportunity to object to the assessments might prevent 
deductions from being made from funds exempt from the 
DOC’s policy.  See Higgins, 293 F.3d at 694 (suggesting that 
a pre-deprivation hearing might have prevented prison 
administrators from improperly seizing VA benefits). 
 
Requiring that the DOC provide pre-deprivation 
process need not be administratively burdensome.  Other 
jurisdictions have been able to implement pre-deprivation 
process in similar circumstances.  The State of Iowa, which 
requires nearly all of its criminal offenders to pay restitution 
while incarcerated, requires that prison administrators provide 
“[w]ritten notice of the amount of the deduction . . . to the 
inmate, who shall have five days after receipt of the notice to 
submit in writing any and all objections to the deduction.”  
Iowa Code § 904.702(1); see also Walters v. Grossheim, 525 
N.W.2d 830, 832–33 (Iowa 1994) (holding that due process 
considerations required similar procedures).  In Ohio, prison 
administrators must provide “notice to the inmate of the debt 
and its intent to seize money from the inmate’s account,” 
“inform the inmate of a right to claim exemptions,” and 
provide the inmate with “an opportunity to assert any 
exemption or defense” before any money may be withdrawn 
from the account.  State v. Peacock, 2003-Ohio-6772 (Ct. 
App. 2003); see also Ohio Admin. Code 5120-5-03(C). 
 
In sum, considering the factors required by Mathews, 
the government’s interest in collecting restitution, fines, and 
other costs from convicted criminals does not overcome the 
default requirement that inmates be provided with process 
before being deprived of funds in their inmate accounts.  The 
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District Court therefore erred in holding that the DOC’s post-
deprivation grievance procedures were all that the 
Constitution required. 
3. 
 
Having determined that no sufficient reason exists to 
deviate from the default of pre-deprivation notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, we now consider whether Hale 
received sufficient process in this case.  The Corrections 
Officials argue that Hale’s sentencing hearing and subsequent 
appellate rights provide all the pre-deprivation process Hale is 
due.  We disagree and hold that Hale’s sentencing hearing 
was insufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.   
 
The Corrections Officials’ argument primarily relies 
on the decision in Buck v. Beard, 879 A.2d 157, 161 (Pa. 
2005).  In Buck, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that 
the Pennsylvania and federal Constitutions did not require the 
DOC to obtain a judicial determination of ability to pay prior 
to deducting funds from an inmate account.  Id. at 159–60.  
As the prior Third Circuit panel in this very case noted, the 
“Court’s reasoning in Buck informs our analysis,” but “it is 
not dispositive.”  Montañez I, 344 F. App’x at 835.   
 
The simple response to the Corrections Officials’ 
reliance on Buck is that we largely agree with that decision.  
Pennsylvania need not provide an additional judicial hearing 
for every inmate to determine ability to pay before making 
deductions from their inmate account when the sentencing 
court has already considered the inmate’s ability to pay when 
entering the sentence.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9726(d) (“In 
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determining the amount and method of payment of a fine, the 
court shall take into account the financial resources of the 
defendant and the nature of the burden that its payment will 
impose.”).  Hale’s challenge, however, is not that the DOC 
must provide a judicial default hearing prior to the 
commencement of inmate deductions.  Rather, Hale argues 
that, regardless of the source of the information, inmates must 
be at least notified of the DOC Policy and the final amount of 
costs to be deducted and be given an opportunity to be heard 
on objections to the amounts prior to the deductions.  Buck 
simply does not address this argument. 
 
Our prior cases make plain that the mere fact that an 
inmate’s sentence includes a fine, coupled with a state statute 
compelling prison administrators to deduct funds from the 
inmate’s prison account, does not satisfy the requirements of 
pre-deprivation due process.  Higgins, 293 F.3d at 694.  In 
Higgins, we considered a similar cost recovery scheme in 
New Jersey and held that the inmate had “alleged sufficient 
facts to establish that he was entitled to a predeprivation 
notice and hearing” despite the fact that he had an opportunity 
to challenge the monetary portion of his judgment during 
sentencing.  Id.  Similarly, the existence of a general statutory 
provision and implementing regulations providing the DOC 
with authority to collect funds from inmates’ accounts does 
not satisfy the Commonwealth’s obligation to provide prior 
notice and an opportunity to be heard to inmates regarding 
deductions from inmate accounts.  See Montanez I, 344 F. 
App’x at 835–36 (“[A] general statement of financial 
obligations and notice of the state’s ability to debit an 
unspecified amount from an inmate account does not settle 
the legal question of whether violations of due process 
occurred . . ..”).   
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At a minimum, federal due process requires inmates to 
be informed of the terms of the DOC Policy and the amount 
of their total monetary liability to the Commonwealth.  See 
Higgins, 293 F.3d at 694.  In particular, the DOC must 
disclose to each inmate before the first deduction:  the total 
amount the DOC understands the inmate to owe pursuant to 
the inmate’s sentence; the rate at which funds will be 
deducted from the inmate’s account; and which funds are 
subject to deduction.  Further, inmates must have a 
meaningful opportunity to object to the application of the 
DOC Policy to their inmate accounts before the first 
deductions commence.  This opportunity to object is required 
to protect against the possibility of error in the application of 
the DOC Policy, such as mistakes in reporting of an inmate’s 
total liability or to ensure that deductions are not made from 
funds that are exempt.  See Id. at 693 (Veterans 
Administration disability benefits are not subject to deduction 
to satisfy criminal fines).   
 
To be clear, we do not suggest that the DOC must 
provide each inmate with a formal, judicial-like hearing 
before the onset of deductions.  Moreover, we find nothing 
substantively unreasonable about the DOC’s refusal to 
provide exceptions to its across-the-board 20% rate of 
deduction, in light of the fact that the DOC will not make 
deductions when an inmate’s account falls below a certain 
minimum.  Because we find the deduction rate to be 
reasonable, the DOC need not entertain a challenge to the rate 
of deduction, though it must provide an opportunity for 
inmates to object to potential errors in the deduction process. 
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We also do not mean to suggest that inmates must 
have an opportunity to be heard prior to each deduction.  
Rather, after providing the required initial notice the DOC 
could provide inmates with an informal opportunity to supply 
written objections to prison administrators prior to the first 
deduction.  See, e.g., Iowa Code § 904.702(1); Ohio Admin 
Code 5120-5-03(C).  We need not set forth specific 
procedures, and the DOC retains discretion, consistent with 
its constitutional obligations, to implement such procedures in 
a flexible and cost-effective manner. 
 
4. 
 
Applying these principles to Hale’s case, there exist 
genuine disputes of material fact that preclude summary 
judgment for the Corrections Officials.  First, Hale’s 
sentencing hearing, standing alone, did not satisfy his federal 
due process rights with regard to deductions pursuant to the 
DOC Policy.  See Montañez I, 344 F. App’x at 836.  At no 
point during the sentencing hearing was Hale ever informed 
of the DOC Policy or of the fact that the DOC would 
automatically deduct 20% of all funds to pay for the monetary 
portion of Hale’s sentence.  Second, the parties submitted 
conflicting evidence as to the exact extent of the notice Hale 
received regarding his sentence and the DOC Policy.  The 
Corrections Officials submitted a declaration asserting that 
during new inmate orientation, Hale received an inmate 
handbook that set forth “pertinent provisions” of the DOC 
Policy, was orally informed of the Policy, and was shown an 
orientation video that also included a description of the 
Policy.   Further, a document in the record from Hale’s 
institutional file, dated prior to the first deduction from Hale’s 
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account, contains a form notice outlining the parameters of 
the DOC Policy.   
 
Although Hale admits that he received the inmate 
handbook, he specifically denies that the DOC informed him 
that funds would be taken from his account or the rate at 
which it would be deducted.  Notably, the inmate handbook 
Hale received did not explain the 20% deduction rate.  Hale 
also specifically denies that he received any memo or other 
notice regarding the DOC Policy.  In addition, Hale states that 
he only learned that funds would be deducted from his inmate 
account after the first such deduction.  There is also a dispute 
of fact as to whether Hale was promptly informed of the total 
amount of his criminal judgment because it was sent to his 
home address while he was incarcerated.  Moreover, the 
Corrections Officials concede that Hale was not provided 
with any opportunity to be heard before the DOC began 
making deductions to his account.   
Because disputes of fact exist regarding notice and 
because Hale never had any opportunity to be heard prior to 
being deprived of funds in his inmate account, we will reverse 
the District Court’s order granting summary judgment to the 
Corrections Officials. 
 
C. 
 
Hale also argues that the District Court erred in 
holding that the DOC was entitled to qualified immunity with 
regard to Hale’s claims for monetary relief.  We will affirm 
the District Court on this issue.   
 
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from 
suit even if their actions were unconstitutional as long as 
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those officials’ actions ‘d[id] not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.’”  Burns, 642 F.3d at 176 (quoting 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (alteration in 
original).  
 
At the time that the deductions from Hale’s account 
first occurred in February 2004, it was not clearly established 
in this Court that the failure to provide prison inmates with a 
pre-deprivation opportunity to object to automatic deductions 
from their prison accounts violated the Due Process Clause.  
In 2005, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Buck v. 
Beard, which could be read to suggest that a sentencing 
hearing was the only pre-deprivation hearing constitutionally 
required.  879 A.2d 157 (Pa. 2005).  Further, earlier decisions 
of our Court had held that, in some circumstances, post-
deprivation remedies were sufficient constitutional process 
for deductions.  See, e.g., Tillman, 221 F.3d at 422.  For these 
reasons, there was a sufficient lack of clarity in Third Circuit 
and Pennsylvania case law regarding automatic deductions 
that the Corrections Officials should be entitled to qualified 
immunity in this case. 
 
Hale also argues that certain of the defendants are not 
entitled to qualified immunity because they performed only 
ministerial functions.  Some courts have held that government 
officials conducting ministerial acts are not entitled to 
qualified immunity.  See, e.g., Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 
844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001).  Hale’s claim, however, is 
predicated on the discretionary decision regarding the 
necessity or not of a predeprivation hearing and the nature of 
that hearing. Therefore, qualified immunity applies. 
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The fact that the defendants are entitled to qualified 
immunity on Hale’s damages claim does not prevent this case 
from moving forward on Hale’s claim for injunctive relief.  
Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 244 (3d Cir. 
2006) (“[T]he defense of qualified immunity is available only 
for damages claims—not for claims requesting prospective 
injunctive relief.”).  As a result, Hale may still proceed to trial 
on his claim for injunctive relief. 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order to the extent that it granted summary judgment 
to the Corrections Officials on Hale’s due process claim, and 
will remand this case for further proceedings regarding Hale’s 
claim for injunctive relief.  We will affirm the District Court’s 
order in all other respects. 
